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Germany has developed an ambitious strategy to increase the share of renewable sources 
in its energy matrix and to enable the transition to a green industrial paradigm. Known as 
Energiewende, the policy implied profound structural transformations in the energy system. 
Participation of the residents and of small entrepreneurs stands out among its particularities. 
The state leads the transitional project by mediating the divergent interests among social 
and economic agents. The challenge is to maintain social consensus despite unequal costs. 
Individual consumers, farmers and some industries faced high electricity prices while 
energy-intensive industries were exempt, a disparity that attracts much criticism. The project 
involves dismantling nuclear power plants, which leads to increasing use of coal or natural 
gas. Another challenge is to keep investments on track. This article presents the topic from 
its historical development and shows that German energy strategy surpasses moral and 
economic concerns. Beyond economics and energy security, it is a broader plan to place the 
country in the vanguard transition to green capitalism.
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Resumo
A Alemanha desenvolveu uma estratégia ambiciosa para aumentar a participação de fontes 
renováveis na matriz energética e viabilizar a transição para um paradigma verde. Conhecida 
como Energiewende, essa política implicou profundas transformações estruturais no sistema 
energético. A participação da população e de pequenos empreendedores destaca-se entre 
as suas particularidades. O Estado conduz o projeto, mediando interesses divergentes entre 
1 Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais San Tiago Dantas (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP); Instituto 
Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia para Estudos sobre os Estados Unidos (INCT-Ineu), ambos em São Paulo/SP, 
Brasil. E-mail: reissolange@gmail.com
Artigo submetido em 20/02/2017 e aprovado em 20/09/2017.
230
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 12, n. 3, 2017, p. 229-249
Energiewende: german energy policy in times of green transition
agentes sociais e econômicos. O desafio é manter o consenso social apesar dos custos 
desiguais. Consumidores individuais, agricultores e algumas indústrias sofrem aumento 
no preço da eletricidade, enquanto o setor industrial intensivo em energia recebe isenções, 
situação que gera muitas críticas. O projeto envolve o fechamento do parque nuclear, 
o que leva ao aumento no uso de carvão ou gás. Outro desafio é manter os investimentos 
necessários. O artigo apresenta o tema a partir de seu desenvolvimento histórico, indicando 
que a estratégia ultrapassa preocupações morais e econômicas atuais. Para além da economia 
e da segurança energética, o projeto posiciona o país na vanguarda da transição para o 
capitalismo verde.
Palavras-chave: Energiewende; Alemanha; Energia Renovável; Capitalismo Verde.
Introduction
Will an industrialized country that consumes a substantial amount of energy 
and still has pretty high emissions manage to achieve the ambitious goals 
without jeopardizing the security of supply, triggering a massive increase 
in energy prices and, above all, scaring off power-intensive branches of 
industry? (DEUTSCHE BANK, 2012, p. 2)
At some point in one Deutsche Bank report, these questions arise about the 
viability of the German energy policy called Energiewende. Similar doubts foster 
debates in various academic, political, and communication spheres. At the heart 
of the issue lies the effectiveness of the German strategy to achieve high rates of 
electricity from renewable sources and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while 
eliminating the use of nuclear energy.
Energiewende comprises a set of legislation, incentives and investments to 
increase the share of renewable sources in electricity generation and to combat 
climate change. Its design implies costs and transformations that require constant 
engagement of economic and social sectors. 
Although the government is the architect of this transformation, the horizontality 
of the operational process involves individuals and city councils, as well as small 
and large entrepreneurs. The strategy started before German Reunification, 
surviving governments of different ideological orientations. The environmental 
motivations coincide with those of the European Union (EU), but the project 
reflects the German conception that energy and industrial policy go side by side.
Given the growing integration of the German market with the European 
energy infrastructure, Energiewende impacts neighboring countries. Some of them 
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see German energy policy with good anticipation; other nations perceive it as a 
catalyst for regional asymmetries. According to some critics, with the excuse for 
reducing domestic and regional dependence on external fossil resources, Germany 
plans to lead the common market by becoming a major exporter of secondary 
energy and leveraging markets for its green technology industry.
With regard to external dependence, the option to end nuclear energy implies 
more gas consumption in the short and medium term. Good for Russia, bad for 
transatlantic relations, significant for international politics.
The article summarizes its historical and regulatory points, and indicates some 
possible effects for Germany’s foreign energy policy. It highlights the role of the 
state as a transformative agent towards a new model of industrialization in the 21st 
Century. As the last section of this paper shows, a similar sort of Schumpeterian 
green transition is being adapted and advanced by emerging countries such as 
China as a way to sustain its enormous economic needs.
History
The Energiewende has ambitious goals and implies structural and regulatory 
transformations in the way that energy is generated, subsidized, distributed and 
remunerated.
Figure 1: Goals and Results
Emission reduction goals 2020 2030 2040 2050 Situation in 2014
Reduction of greenhouse gas 
emission (year basis 1990)
- 40% - 55% - 70% - 80% - 26,4%
Renewable sources in total 
energy consumption
+18% +30% +45% +60% +12,4% (*2013)
Renewable sources in total 
power consumption
– +40% +55% +80% +27,3%
Reduction in primary energy 
consumption (year basis 2008)
- 20% – – - 50% - 9,1%
Reduction in power consumption 
(year base 2008)
- 10% – – - 25% - 4,8%
Source: AGORA, 2015; BUCHAN, 2012.
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The project stands on four pillars: (a) public incentives for renewable energy as 
primary source for electricity; (b) infrastructure modernization, (c) decentralization 
of supply and consumer autonomy; (d) closing of the nuclear industry. Structured 
around the increase of wind and solar energy, it proposes to eliminate the use of 
nuclear power plants until 2022 and drastically reduce the percentage of coal in 
the energy matrix until 2050.
German government took the first steps in that direction in the 1970s, when 
oil shocks took place and environmental protection ideas gained track. As many 
other countries did, Germany also sought to diversify its oil suppliers beyond the 
Middle East. That led to the intensification of its relations with the Soviet Union 
in the wake of the Ostpolitik and the gradual incorporation of “red gas” (Russian) 
into West Germany energy matrix (HÖGSELIUS, 2013). 
At the same time, it sought to increase energy security through renewable 
sources and the creation of public agencies for planning and implementing clean 
energy policies. Although the term “energy security” comprises various definitions, 
from geopolitical to economical sense, this paper consider it as low vulnerability 
of vital energy systems (CHERPA; JEWELL, 2014). 
Investments in nuclear power grew at that time too, but the resistance of 
the population represented a constant barrier to the nuclear sector. Anti-nuclear 
feelings since the 1970s partly explain why Energiewende is welcome by civil 
society today notwithstanding the economic and social costs of the process.
The concept of “energy transition” was borrowed from the book “Energie-
Wende: Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdol und Uran” about growth and 
well-being without oil and uranium. The book argued that the fundamental and 
radical change in the energy policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (and of 
the industrialized countries in general) has become indispensable” (KRAUSE, 
BOSSEL, REISSMANN, 1980, p. 13).
The Green Party´s (Die Grünen) first election for Federal Parliament in 1983 
and the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine three years later stimulated the 
establishment of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Construction and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturshutz, 
Bau and Reaktorsicherheit), raising the issue in the hierarchy of the institutional 
agenda.
Since then, a set of initiatives at federal, state and municipal levels have 
redesigned the rules of the electric sector. Those actions included fostering 
production of clean energy at residences and the dismantling of operational 
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monopolies. The issue gained urgency during German Reunification in 1990 as 
the industrial and energy industries in former East Germany relied on energy 
intensive Soviet model.
On a regional level, the adhesion to the European Energy Charter in 1994 
stimulated market liberalization. It also helped dismantling large conglomerates 
of electricity in the European bloc, prohibiting suppliers from participating in 
power distribution. The model adopted in Germany opened doors for wind and 
solar generators that still lacked competitiveness. By the time of Kyoto Protocol in 
1997, the country committed itself to more ambitious targets than the EU. While 
the bloc proposed to reduce pollutant emissions by 8% over 1990 levels, Germany 
made the individual commitment of 21%. (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2017). 
It is important to note that Chancellor Angela Merkel was in charge of 
the Ministry of Environment during Kyoto negotiations. The fact counts as an 
indication that the development of Energiewende extrapolates ideological or partisan 
divisions. Therefore it could be viewed as raison d´état and national interest. The 
environmental policy of conservative coalitions does not differ conceptually from 
the leftist proposals despite the differences regarding the nuclear issue and the 
extent of the state role (HAKE et. al, 2015). 
In the United States, for instance, the cleavage between Democrats and 
Republicans persists with regard to the adoption of climate policies, as the latter 
tend to prevent legislation on environmental protection (FERREIRA; VIGEVANI, 
FERREIRA, 2012).
In 2002, the first fully left-wing coalition in West Germany, by Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, also known as Red-
Green Coalition, approved the closure of the national nuclear plants (Atomaustieg) 
by 2022. Although more motivated by the risk of accidents and toxic waste 
effects, and less by the level of pollution inherent in uranium mining, the socialist 
proposal placed Germany at the forefront of a clean energy system with less threat 
to human security.
Continuing the paradigm shift, the conservative coalition by the CDU/
CSU-Fraktion and the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) adopted the 
“Energiekonzept” (DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, 2010) in 2010. The document 
focused on making Germany one of the world most energy-efficient and climate-
friendly economies, but the path should be gradual and market-oriented. The plan 
announced the postponement, for up to 14 years, of the closure of nuclear power 
plants, as atomic technology should serve as a bridge in the energy transition.
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The setback, called by the media as “Exit out of Exit” (DIE ZEIT, 2011), 
reflected the pressure of interest groups, notably the fossil segment, as well as 
the economic crisis and the austerity in the European bloc. While defending a 
non-fossil pattern, Merkel had always opposed the dismantling of the nuclear 
industry (SOKOL, 2005).
However, the return of nuclear policy did not avenge. Popular demonstrations, 
criticism by left opposition and the accident at the Japanese Fukushima plant in 
2011 forced the government to rewind and shut down eight nuclear power stations 
that run with reactors built before 1980. The number of nuclear plants closed at 
once was equivalent to more than 50 percent of the entire national installations 
(DEUTSCHE WELLE, 2011). The Parliament approved the reversal by 80% of votes. 
One of the rejections votes came from Die Linke, the far-left party that advocated 
for an even faster dismantling (APPUNN, 2015). Since then, Energiewende has 
gained solidity and controversy.
Development
Wind and solar power are the central elements of the transformation, which 
increased the share of renewables in electricity generation from 4% in 1990 to 
27% in 2014 (NOW, 2014, p. 5). Due to initial costs and intermittency that typically 
characterized these two industries at that time, the challenge was to innovate in 
technology and adopt regulations that would make the two sources more reliable 
and competitive. High costs, coupled with operational instability, would reduce 
public support and affect the export sector.
The solution required state intervention to ensure, through legislation, the 
priority of alternative sources in the distribution network despite the lack of 
competitiveness of renewable energy plants in its initial phase. In this sense, 
Energiewende exemplifies German ordoliberalism.
The central tenet of ordoliberalism is that governments should regulate markets 
in such a way that market outcome approximates the theoretical outcome in a 
perfectly competitive market (in which none of the actors are able to influence 
the price of goods and services)”. (DULLIEN, GUÉROT, 2012, p. 2).
The first mechanism applied was the feed-in tariff (FiT) laws of 1991, which 
established a tariff system for the protection of the renewable segment. The FiT 
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guaranteed a fixed remuneration for 20 years and priority for green sources in the 
network of national power distribution. This regulation is a public incentive with 
great support from the political class (LAIRD, STEFES, 2009, p. 2622).
As energy from renewable sources may be more expensive in its early 
beginning, the legislation allowed the four major distributors (Eon, RWE, EnBW 
and Vattenfall) to buy expensive energy from green operators and resell it in the 
European Energy Exchange, which trades electricity, natural gas, permits for CO2 
emissions and coal through spot and derivative contracts. Final consumers such 
as residences, commerce, services and non-energy intensive industries pay for 
the difference between wholesale and stock market prices. That marks the first 
imbalance in the distribution of costs, an inequality that fuels much criticism.
Other sectors that receive additional tariff exemptions are energy-intensive 
industries such as chemical and metallurgical, and factories that generate their own 
energy. These exceptions preserve the competitiveness of the giants, burdening 
small and medium-sized industries, residences, and commerce.
FiT tariffs were questioned in the European Court of Justice as a sort of subsidy 
and, thus, a violation of free trade rules. In 2001, the Court dismissed the claims 
as unfounded arguing that EU member states could oblige electricity distributors 
to buy clean energy at a price above market value as long as they repassed the 
costs to consumers. This interpretation also took into account the importance of 
renewable energy for the environment and the reduction of greenhouse gases that 
cause climate change (EUROPEAN COURT, 2001). Currently, more than two-thirds 
of European countries adopt some form of FiT (LAIRD, STEFES, 2009, p. 2244).
In July 2016, German Parliament approved reforms, maintaining the fixed 
remuneration system only for small producers, such as residences and commercial 
business that had installed solar panels on their roofs. Medium and large providers 
of clean energy must follow the market prices. Those reforms serve the interests 
of traditional generators and non-tariff-free industries; on the other hand, by 
maintaining fixed remuneration mechanism for smaller producers, the government 
aims to guarantee operational and political support from the population. The 
economic sustainability of the Energiewende will be under test from now on as 
the visible hand of the state reduces its intervention.
The project receives increasing support from the population, although this 
varies according to economy mood: more than 90% support Energiewende 
(WETTENGEL, 2016). The popular participation is not restricted to ideas and 
voting, as residential consumers bear much of the extra costs. By 2013, households 
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contributed €8.3 billion of the total €23.6 billion spent on electricity, although 
residential consumption was only a quarter of the total (NOW, 2014, p. 31). The 
same type of support is common among politicians, as 85% of Parliament voted 
in favor of related legislations (NOW, 2014, p. 9).
Decentralization is what favors German energy policy in comparison with 
similar experiences in other countries. It is possible to say that Energiewende is 
the most participative process of energy transition in a capitalist state, whose 
macro objective is to develop a policy based on environmental safer provision 
of energy, self-sufficiency and future competitiveness. It means energy security 
without geopolitical constraints.
One measure towards decentralization was to reduce monopolies in the energy 
generation and distribution sectors. Four energy giants — Eon, RWE, ENBH and 
Vatenfall — control the thermoelectric sector but split the renewable segment with 
industries, small businesses, cooperatives, project developers, farms and citizens. 
In 2013, small producers were responsible for 46% of renewable energy installed 
capacity, compared to 13% of large operators, and 41% of strategic institutions 
and investors (BORSCHERT, 2015). 
Another relevant aspect is the decentralization achieved by placing the local 
distribution systems under the supervision of city councils and due to large 
community involvement in planning and fundraising. Individuals can invest 
from €100 to €500 in green energy generation projects, which promotes popular 
engagement in the defense of industry interests (BUCHAN, 2012, p. 10). 
According to Quitzow et al. (2016), the development of state-of-the-art 
technology for renewable energies finds its roots in communitarian projects and in 
the economic model based on small and medium-sized businesses. Approximately 
99% of the general enterprises in the country fit into the so-called Mittelstand, 
responsible for 55% of GDP (BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND 
ENERGIE, 2014).
Over time the green policy has been battling fossil-fuelled industries, politicians 
linked to traditional energy inside and outside the country, part of the liberal 
media and even radical environmentalist. For a renowned British magazine, 
Energiewende meant expensive energy and increased carbon emissions due to 
the replacement of nuclear by coal (THE ECONOMIST, 2014). “Although the share 
of renewable energy in the German grid has increased since the year 2000, CO2 
emissions have also risen since 2009. Is Germany trapped in the Energy Transition 
Paradox?” (NOW, 2014). 
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Virulent criticisms also come from the progressive side. Boisert (2013) 
acknowledges that Germany was pioneer, but he sees its energy leadership as 
one of today’s most demoralizing ironies. 
The Energiewende is not the swift, bold advance that greens imagine but 
a slow, timid, and inadequate response to the crisis of climate change. 
It represents a failure of nerve, a failure of imagination, and a failure of 
arithmetic. It is visibly failing now, and if it succeeds in all its stated goals it 
will still fail. It is failing for a simple reason: the environmental movement, 
whose signal triumph is its influence over energy policy, has rejected nuclear 
power—the best source of clean energy we have”. (BOISERT, 2013).
The figure below indicates that the emissions indeed increased between 2009 
and 2010, which might having be caused by growth in oil (and coal) consumption 
as oil price fell during those years. Again between 2011 and 2013, what maybe 
reflected the sudden shutdown of some nuclear power plants.
Figure 2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Germany
Fonte: CLEAN ENERGY WIRE, 2017
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The graphic information above reveals that 2016 was a negative year for 
German emission reduction target. Harsh weather, growing economy and increase 
in population — about 1 million refugees were allowed to live in the country in 
2015 — could explain the downturn (WETTENGEL, 2016). 
German energy policy has indeed many challenges. However, after more than 
20 years of the resilient “Energie Konzept”, the mixing system of fossil fuels and 
renewable energy has proven its maturation: today Germany has the world’s most 
reliable electricity generation (BALL, 2017).
Many challenges need to be overcome, such as the distances between the 
wind farms concentrated in the north of the country and the urban and industrial 
centers in the south. The alternative is to increase and modernize the transmission 
lines. It happens that the modernization and the ideal functioning of the network 
depend on heavy and continuous investments as part of a long-term political and 
economic strategy. 
Vaclav Smil argues that energy infrastructure is one of the most expensive 
investments in the world, and that the longevity and inertia of many energy 
enterprises make it impossible for any complex national system to reconfigure itself 
in three to four decades (SMIL, 2015). Quite a pessimistic view! Notwithstanding 
many obstacles, the prospects are shiny for German energy policy. 
The direction of change is clear. At every stage since the 1970s, when the anti-
nuclear movement saw the first stirrings of what would become the Energiewende, 
its ambitions have been dismissed as impossible to deliver. At every stage that 
has proved wrong. (…) The Energiewende has altered the energy mix in Germany 
and broken the old business model of the power-generating utilities. But there is 
much more to come (BUTLER, 2016).
Energy foreign relations
Sustainability alone does not explain such a radical policy. The foundations of 
Energiewende were also established in the quest for less energy dependence, more 
economic growth and in the search for the state of the art technology (QUITZOW 
et al., 2016, p. 2). With 61.4% dependence on foreign resources, energy policy 
means foreign policy for Germany. Therefore, the key word behind it is energy 
security in the sense of low vulnerability of any kind.
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Figure 3: Domestic production and imports
Source: WETTENGEL, 2016.
As gas in Germany is often used for heating, and not as much for electricity, 
Energiewende shall not affect imports in the medium term. Imported gas comes 
through western and eastern pipelines, with strong geopolitical implications in 
the second case. 
The option for shutting down the nuclear power plants and the majority of 
the mining industries by 2050 should underscore the importance of Russian gas. 
Broadly speaking, Energiewende deepens relations with Russia for now and loosen 
them in the long term.
Energy security, environmental concerns and economic growth explain 
Germany´s interest in keeping Energiewende and in becoming a major energy 
actor in its region as well as a green technology exporter. 
One example of this effort is the creation of the Energy Export Initiative. 
Commissioned by the federal government since 2002, the program helps German 
companies to reach markets abroad. 
To achieve these goals the country cannot depend on foreign fossil fuels 
anymore. Russian has been a reliable partner so far, but a large volume of oil 
comes from political instable areas such as the Middle East. Germany has coal 
reserves but the dirty mineral must be left behind if environmental health and 
climate change are considered. 
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Therefore, part of the strategy is to become itself a reliable provider of 
electricity. In the first semester of 2017, Germany exported 11% of its electricity 
production to Central and East European countries (MORRIS, 2017). 
Eventually, countries with low-cost renewable energy production will absorb 
regional green market shares and even compete with German industries in Germany. 
One-step in this direction is the EEG 2016, which allows neighbors states to supply 
renewable energy to Germany as long as they participate competitively in the 
auctions adopted with the reforms.
Maintaining and broadening the green shift in the next decades is crucial 
to Germany economy and overall security. This road has brought (and will keep 
bringing) opportunities for cooperation with countries such as China, which 
has pursued a similar energy transformation in the last years. This scenario, as 
shown in the next section, could also mean fierce competition in the next phase 
of industrialization.
Besides the economic gains indicated in this paper, Germany also enjoys the 
benefits of green energy as soft power. Apart from being an active player in all UN 
climate change negotiations so far, the country has expanded global governance 
in renewables. 
One year after the first oil shock, the secretary of State of the United States, 
Henry Kissinger, proposed an international institution to organize and defend 
the interests of oil consuming countries. The plead led to the creation of the 
International Energy Agency to increase predictability in order to avoid geopolitical 
constraints and market disruptions. Considering its focus on finite resources and 
rather negligent concern with renewables, the organization could also be named 
“International Fossil Agency”.
A similar institution for green energy was not created until Germany tried 
to test its soft power by convincing other countries that Energiewende could be 
replicated worldwide. 
A remarkable initiative to develop renewable energy abroad was the creation of 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), an international organization 
whose existence is the result of German efforts at intergovernmental level. In 
2007, while using its presidency on the EU Council and the G8, Germany started 
to work for the creation of an organism outside the UN, where powerful forces 
blocked any proposal of that kind. 
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While Germany successfully promoted a 20% target for the expansion of RE 
in the EU, the 2006 and 2007 sessions of the UN CSD proved to be a serious 
blowback for the German strategy to promote RE on a global scale. Instead 
of approving the desired time-bound targets for a global share of RE, the 
session resulted without any agreement. While already an increasing number 
of G77 supported RE, the Gulf States let by Saudi Arabia blocked a decision 
underlining the importance of RE. After this experience, the Environment 
Ministry decided to change its strategy. Instead of trying to push RE within the 
UN, it decided to work on the creation of a new international organization for 
RE outside of the UN framework, uniting like-minded countries. Under the 
aegis of Karsten Sach, Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, 
the Environment Ministry mobilized political support within the German 
Government. Together with the Development Ministry and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it started an international campaign for IRENA’s creation 
(ROHERKASTEN; WESTPHAL, 2013).
IRENA was finally developed in 2008 without the support of many countries, 
including the emerging nations such as China, India and Brazil. The first two 
signed to it later, but Brazil still resists membership as IRENA focus on solar and 
wind, while the country favors hydropower and biofuels. Today, IRENA has 150 
members and 27 are under process of becoming members. 
Reproducing German green transition in other countries is definitely a 
challenge. Low credit, underknowledge and the lack of an appropriate domestic 
political system might block any chance in many nations. Who knows? 
Specialists like Vaclav Smil are deeply pessimistic with renewable capacity 
to adequately scale in order to satisfy energy demand in our modern societies. 
I like renewables, but they move slowly. There’s an inherent inertia, a 
slowness in energy transitions. It would be easier if we were still consuming 
66,615 kilowatt-hours per capita, as in 1950. But in 1950 few people had 
air-conditioning. We’re a society that demands electricity 24/7. This is very 
difficult with sun and wind.Look at Germany, where they heavily subsidize 
renewable energy. When there’s no wind or sun, they boost up their old coal-
fired power plants. The result: Germany has massively increased coal imports 
from the US, and German greenhouse gas emissions have been increasing, 
from 917 million metric tons in 2011 to 931 million in 2012, because they’re 
burning American coal. It’s totally zany! (SMIL, 2013).
As the next section points out, more optimistic views show otherwise. 
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Green industrial transition
Beyond regional gains, Energiewende might place Germany in a broader 
competitive condition if global climate governance advances. A comprehensive 
agreement as intended in COP 21 (Paris Agreement) would raise fossil costs, 
favoring German industries to the detriment of many competitors in industrialized 
countries. Both solar and wind industries have a high initial capital investment, 
but the marginal cost approaches zero after depreciation.
As one of the global leaders in green technology, the country has achieved 
this position by making huge R&D investments (private and public) in renewable 
energy. Germany has strengthened its capacity to export products and services 
for manufacturing solar and wind devices, trying to turn itself from a fossil fuels 
dwarf into a green energy power.
Political studies on renewable energy focus the economic losses and gains 
for different sectors and on how partisan agendas reflect the preferences of voters 
and interest groups. In other words, (domestic) politics guides the discussion. 
Normally absent from international relations analysis — except in debates about 
climate governance — the issue is seldom observed from an international power 
politics perspective.
A transition to green energy paradigm requires attention to the dynamics 
of international politics on multiple levels such as economic, finance, trade, 
technology, law, environment, human rights, and many others. Besides, one must 
not forget the tight industrial competition among countries and on how energy 
security (cheap, reliable and abundant) may define winners and losers. 
For decades, the definition of security energy prioritized fossil fuels and its 
implications for international security and world stability. After so many resource 
wars in last and current centuries, few would disagree that — even in times of 
abundance — fossil fuels are potential conflict-triggers. Mainly due to unequal 
geographic distribution of resources that brings nations to geopolitical disputes 
or to permanent dependence on highly politicized market. 
German trajectory finds cooperation and competition with other industrial 
powers such as China, which is inserted in the select group of countries that 
seek to promote profound changes in energy systems. In 2015, China led global 
investments in renewable energy, followed by the United States, and far ahead 
of Germany and Brazil, respectively in sixth and seventh position (FRANKFURT 
SCHOOL-UNEP CENTER / BNEF, 2016).
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Among the ten largest investors in this ranking, Brazil and Germany were 
the only ones that reduced investments in 2015 compared to the prior year. In 
the Brazilian case, the economic and political crisis that has been affecting the 
country since then explain the fall. As for Germany, the reduction could be related 
to uncertainties regarding the future of FiT, a proof that domestic system may not 
be enough mature to be guided only by the invisible hand of the market.
In the United States, renewable energy sector gained emphasis during Obama 
administration. As the democrat President expressed in the State of the Union 
Address of 2010, “the nation leading the clean energy economy will command the 
global economy” suggesting that the United States should empower itself to the role.
Despite the roller coaster of legislations that allowed and withdrawn incentives 
for renewables after 2013, the U.S. the country invested $44 billion in clean energy 
in 2015. The current scenario, however, discourages investments as President 
Donald Trump promises to increase production of non-renewable sources and to 
create jobs in the fossil sector. 
As Republicans control both Houses in Congress after Trump´s election, it will 
not be difficult for the President to deliver on campaign promises by discouraging 
growth in renewable energy sector. If this perspective is confirmed, the U.S. will 
step back from what Matthews (2017) calls the “green shift”.
In the author’s view, green transition means the destruction of an energy 
system based on the exploitation of fossil resources, characterized by geographic 
concentration, high production costs and geopolitical risks. On the other hand, 
the manufacturing of renewable energy is justified by the reduction of costs, 
geographic decentralization (energy produced anywhere and at any time) and 
the absence of geopolitical threats. “The green shift is the latest episode of this 
process of Schumpeterian industrial evolution”, he argues.
It encompasses more than energy policies on moral grounds. The main 
purpose of the green shift is to achieve energy security and economic leadership 
in the 21st century, when manufacturing costs will be the determining factor in 
industrial competition.
A paradox of our times is that, while libertarian ideas of small government 
gain track, a country with overwhelming state presence on economic activity 
leads investments in renewables. I refer to China, which in 2015 invested 36% of 
the global total, an amount equivalent to US$ 102 billion.
The cooperation in trade and technology between Germany and China was 
crucial for transforming the Chinese energy system. By acquiring German products 
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and services, China was able to start its own green transition and to become the 
world leader in manufacturing of solar and wind energy. 
Actions taken by the United States and the European Union against China in 
the World Trade Organization — for alleged subsidies and dumping practices in 
Chinese solar and wind industries — indicates the extension of the competition. 
Beijing has tried to avoid those complaints by relocating part of its premises in 
other countries.
Despite its divergent political system, are countries such as Germany and 
China betting on clean energy to overcome environmental constraints, but also 
as a strategy for a new stage of industrial capitalism? Are both nations investing 
in the energy innovation that will sustain Kondratieff’s sixth wave (MATTHEWS, 
2012), and reorganizing the productive base of the next world system leadership 
(ARRIGHI, 1995)? 
Matthews (2016) argues that future industrial leadership will only be achieved 
through green shift. 
Some advantages of renewable energy are not at all obvious and need to 
be made explicit. Fundamentally, they are scalable and can be built in a 
modular way — a solar panel, 100 solar panels, 1000 solar panels. As they are 
replicated in this way, their powers continue to rise without cutting efficiency. 
This cannot be said of nuclear reactors, which have an optimum operational 
size — below or above which the plant is underestimated. Furthermore, as 
they scale, they do not present greater and greater risks. Instead, they are 
relatively benign technologies with no serious risks... More importantly, the 
superiority of conventional renewable energies lies in their cost reduction 
trends, which are linked to the fact that they are always manufacturing and 
production products Where economies of scale actually play a role. This 
means that they offer true energy security, insofar as manufacturing can in 
principle be carried out anywhere (MATTHEWS, 2016). 
The author points out, however, that the green transformation is being mainly 
driven by emerging countries such as China and India. Energy policies of these 
states do not reflect a sense of morality, but “strategies of national development of 
priorities”. The rationality behind this strategy has less to do with public policies, 
corporate interests or demand, and more with cost reduction that green energy 
systems bring to power sector and to agricultural and industrial activities.
In a scenario of intense industrial competition that shall mark the current century, 
the cost factor will be decisive for the industrialization and deindustrialization 
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of countries. Emerging nations in the East face the limits of growth, as fossil 
resources do not increase in the scale needed for the economic development of 
gigantic countries such as India and China. In addition, resource exploitation 
requires involvement in geopolitical issues that add costs of a different nature, 
such as military security. 
In “Greening of Capitalism: How Asia is driving the next great transformation” 
Matthews (2015) says that the third phase of Industrialization will determine 
whether the industrial way of life will be able to continue providing (unequally) 
wealth and well-being without destroying the planet. The answer does not lie in 
moral principles of environmentalism or market opportunism. 
A major structural transformation of capitalism requires state direction. 
Considering the characteristics of Chinese political system, despite its 
authoritarianism, China presents itself as the country with the potential to lead 
the great transformation.
Capitalism is the vibrant technical-economic system that allows such 
industrial dynamics. There is really no secret about why China is seeking 
abundance of energy and resource security through its highly targeted 
industrial strategies. The only mystery is why the West allows it to win in 
the competition unleashed in the international political economy. Changing 
the policy emphasis so that it engages directly with the economy through 
industrial strategy and changing the rationality of renewable energy to 
building energy security through its manufacturing would be an advance to 
restore some equilibrium (MATTHEWS, 2015). 
Those arguments are extensively detailed in his recent book “Global Green 
Shift: When Ceres meets Gaia”. Renewable energy and information technology for 
green energy system is ate the center of what Schumpeter would call a sixth wave 
of creative destruction. It is not only a matter of substituting one technology for 
another, as neoclassical economists would say; it is about reviewing the industrial 
paradigm of our civilization (MATTHEWS, 2017).
Conclusion
The article explained German energy policy, known as Energiewende, from its 
historical perspective and pioneering. Some aspects differentiate German strategy 
from other examples in Europe and in the world. 
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One factor is the active role of the state in planning and implementing 
legislations, infrastructure and incentives. The project survived successive 
government changes throughout the years, proving that its rationality is beyond 
partisanship. 
Other factor is the participation of social actors, such as individuals, farmers, 
cooperatives and small entrepreneurs. Besides paying for higher electricity, those 
stakeholders get direct involvement in green initiative either by installing small 
solar and wind generators in its properties or by financing many of the projects. 
Energiewende is also unique for its commitment to dismantle all nuclear plants 
until 2022, an ambitious target that faces resistance of many economic groups 
and implies more consumption of gas in the short term. Taking into account 
Germany’s poverty in indigenous gas production, the replacement of nuclear by 
gas increases its dependence on Russia, a gesture that triggers a lot of criticism 
nationally and internationally. 
Notwithstanding many barriers, Energiewende turned Germany from an energy 
dwarf into a regional power supplier. The new condition and its prospects has 
explained some changes in Germany´s foreign policy toward East Europe recently, 
as in the case of Ukraine.
Maintaining the plan requires investments in modernization, infrastructure 
and adequate regulations, a challenge that faces constant skepticism among much 
of its opponents. 
However, by implementing a profound energy transition Germany could place 
itself among a select group of countries that will lead a new phase of industrial 
capitalism. A pursue of “green shift” not on moral or environmental grounds but 
as a quest for economic and political power. 
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